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INNOCENT VICTIMS OR PERJURERS BETRAYED? THE ARREST OF THE GENERALS IN XENOPHON'S *ANABASIS*

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the more intriguing episodes in Xenophon's *Anabasis* is his account of the arrest and murder of the Greek generals at Tissaphernes' hands. Xenophon gives the strong impression that this was an act of undiluted treachery on the part of the Persians, and his version has generally been accepted with little comment.¹ This article pieces together some of the events surrounding the arrest. It provides confirmation that the Persians had no intention of honouring the oaths they had sworn, but also demonstrates that the Greeks broke *their* oaths as well.

Ctesias, in his *Persica*, gave an earlier and slightly different account, which has come down to us by means of Photius' epitome (*FGrH* 688 F 27). In that, Ctesias wrote that Tissaphernes plotted against the Greeks, that he won Menon over, and that he used Menon to defeat Clearchus and the other generals. Photius noted Ctesias' comment that Tissaphernes conquered the Greeks by 'a deception and by oaths'. According to the epitome, Clearchus saw the plot beforehand and tried to avoid it, but the majority, who had been deceived by Menon, forced the unwilling Clearchus to go to Tissaphernes. Proxenus, who had been won over beforehand, joined in recommending the deception.

According to Xenophon, Clearchus believed that he was on good terms with Tissaphernes and insisted vehemently, against the objections of soldiers who said that Tissaphernes was not to be trusted, that those invited must attend the fateful meeting. Xenophon is silent on the role played by Menon and Proxenus, apart from the comment that Clearchus knew Menon had met Tissaphernes and was plotting against him in order to win the whole army over to himself and thereby gain Tissaphernes' friendship (2.5.27–30).²

The differences between these two accounts raise a number of interesting questions. A careful analysis of what Xenophon actually says, and at times what he does not say, suggests an answer to some of these queries.

II. THE TREATY

Both Xenophon and Diodorus record the terms of the treaty negotiated between Tissaphernes and the Greeks following the battle of Cunaxa, but Xenophon gives the

¹ Xenophon's interpretation has been accepted by, among others, S. W. Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians* (Hanover and London, 1985), 25, 26, 28, 41; J. Roisman, 'Klearchos in Xenophon's *Anabasis*', *Scripta Classica Israelica* 8–9 (1985–8), 30–52, at 49; D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977), 151–2; J. K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London, 1974), 116. It is discussed by G. Cawkwell in R. Warner (trans.), *Xenophon—The Persian Expedition* (London, 1972), 24–6, but he does not appreciate the implications of the treaty between the Greeks and Persians. See, too, Isoc. *Panegy.* 147 and *Phil.* 91 which promulgate Xenophon's version. All references in this article are to Xenophon's *Anabasis*, unless otherwise indicated.

² Xenophon's own attitude to Tissaphernes is clear. Right at the beginning of the *Anabasis* he notes that Tissaphernes accompanied Cyrus as a friend (1.1.2), and then falsely accused him of plotting against Artaxerxes (1.1.3).

terms in more detail and in direct speech, showing the importance he attached to them. Tissaphernes commented that because he had persuaded Artaxerxes to allow him to save the Greeks, in the face of strong opposition, it was now possible for the Greeks to receive pledges from 'us'. The Persians pledged that they would make the land friendly for the Greeks and would lead them back to Greece without treachery; they would also provide a market for supplies. Wherever it was not possible to buy provisions, the Greeks would be allowed to take them from the country. Of more significance, however, are the terms the Greeks agreed to on their part. Tissaphernes, Xenophon says, told the Greeks that they would need to swear to the Persians that they would march as though through a friendly country, doing no harm, taking food and drink when the Persians did not provide a market, but that if they provided a market the Greeks would obtain their provisions by purchasing them. Xenophon comments that the terms were agreed and Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes' brother-in-law swore and gave their right hands to the generals and captains of the Greeks, who swore in their turn. Although Tissaphernes has attempted to give the opposite impression, it appears that Artaxerxes was not bound by the treaty. Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus both imply, without stating explicitly, that Tissaphernes then accompanied Artaxerxes to Babylon (2.3.26–9; DS 14.26.3–5).³

Xenophon later comments twice in speeches to the soldiers on the difficulties the Greeks faced, being constrained to use the market Tissaphernes provided, but having little or no money with which to purchase their provisions (3.1.20, 3.2.20–1). Tissaphernes, naturally enough in the circumstances, made no arrangement to pay the Greeks, or to give them money with which to buy supplies.⁴ The generals would have been well aware of the implications of the terms Tissaphernes imposed before they accepted them, so a reason must be found for their swearing an oath the army would have difficulty keeping.

III. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE TREATY

The day after the battle of Cunaxa, the Greeks took badly the news that Cyrus was dead, although Clearchus attempted to present a bold front when negotiating with the Persian representatives. The Greeks were hungry and had to kill baggage animals for food (2.1.6, cf. 1.5.6).⁵ Phalinus, the only Greek sent to the Ten Thousand from Artaxerxes and Tissaphernes, when asked for his honest opinion as a fellow Greek,

³ The Persians had a great respect for their land, and were deeply offended if it was ravaged. See, for example, Pharnabazus at Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.33 and Arsites at Arr. *An.* 1.12.9–10. They would resort to burning if they felt no other course was possible, though. See the threat of Tissaphernes at 2.5.19 and the attempted burning of Persian villages by Tissaphernes and his army at 3.5.3. R. Descat, 'Marché et tribut: l'approvisionnement des Dix-Mille', in P. Briant (ed.), *Dans les pas des Dix-Mille: Peuples et pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec*, Pallas 43 (1995), 99–107, at 104–5 emphasises that this was a truce and not a contract of employment between the Greeks and Tissaphernes.

⁴ Isocrates, at *Philippus* 91, claims that Artaxerxes promised to pay the Greeks their wages in full. This appears to be an expansion upon an earlier passage, *Panegyricus* 147, and I can find no evidence to support Isocrates' statement.

⁵ Living on meat was a hardship for the soldiers. So, too, was the loss of animals that could carry their equipment. W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War—Part 1* (Berkeley, 1971), 34, n. 17 discusses the food Greek soldiers took on campaign with them. Of particular interest is the reference to Thuc. 3.49.3, where the Mytilenean envoys provided food of notable quality, consisting of wine, barley, and barley cakes made with wine and oil, for the second trireme.

told the generals, in essence, that they had no hope of survival without the consent of the Great King (2.1.7, 17–19).⁶ At dusk that day, Clearchus called the generals together. He carefully framed his comments in positive terms but, with the Tigris before them and no possibility of obtaining supplies where they were, he effectively said that the only course open to the Greeks was a demoralizing retreat.⁷ During the night, forty Thracian cavalry and about three hundred Thracian soldiers deserted the Greeks for Artaxerxes (2.2.7).

When the Cyreans joined Ariaeus, he commented that they currently had no provisions and that they had been unable to obtain anything for seventeen days (2.2.11). The next day Clearchus would not initiate an attack on Artaxerxes because the soldiers were exhausted and without food (2.2.14).

That night, when the Greeks were camping in villages from which the Persian army had stripped all food and wood (2.2.16), a panic broke out (2.2.18–3.1.1). Clearchus was able to settle the men, but the panic attack demonstrates that the Greek soldiers were highly anxious at this time and frightened of being attacked by the Persians. Xenophon tries to minimize the impact of this panic in the army by surrounding it with comments that *Artaxerxes* was obviously terrified of the *Greeks*. First he gives a preview of what he will go on to narrate, saying that the events of the next day showed that ‘even the king, it appeared, was terrified by the approach of the army’ (ἐξεπλάγη δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ βασιλεὺς τῇ ἐφόδῳ τοῦ στρατεύματος). He describes the panic in the army, but then passes immediately to his description of the following day, using the same words to repeat that ‘the king was terrified by the approach (of the army)’ (. . . βασιλεὺς ἐξεπλάγη τῇ ἐφόδῳ . . .).

Heralds from Artaxerxes arrived the next morning, saying that they wanted to negotiate a truce. Clearchus told the messengers that the Greeks needed food *before* they could talk about a truce, but the reply from Artaxerxes was that guides would lead them to provisions *after* they had concluded an agreement, and the Greeks agreed to this (2.3.1–6, 8–9).⁸

Despite the truce, Clearchus was clearly worried. Xenophon comments that Clearchus was in a hurry on the march to the villages because he suspected that Artaxerxes had deliberately let water into the trenches and canals they encountered, and adds that it was not the right time for irrigating the plain. However, Joannès has shown that what the Greeks encountered was an area under intense cultivation (2.3.10–13).⁹

The villages to which they were led had plenty of provisions, and the Greeks remained there for three days. During this time, Tissaphernes presented himself as a go-between who was a loyal servant of Artaxerxes, but also a neighbour who wanted to earn the gratitude of all Greeks by helping the Cyreans. He asked, on behalf of

⁶ Xenophon emphatically refers to Phalinus as the only Greek sent to the generals, explicitly disagreeing with Ctesias’ claim (*FGrH* 688 F 23 = *Plu. Art.* 13.5–7) to have visited the Ten Thousand with Phalinus.

⁷ Xenophon comments at 2.2.16 that Clearchus was taking care that they did not appear to be fleeing. The anonymous referee has pointed out that there could be a pun on Clearchus’ name at 2.2.6, celebrating the fame (κλέος) of *Κλέαρχος*’ superior command (ἀρχή).

⁸ Xenophon is definite that the heralds came from Artaxerxes. *DS* 14.26.1–2 also notes that the messengers were sent by the king.

⁹ F. Joannès, ‘L’itinéraire des Dix-Mille en Mésopotamie et l’apport des sources cunéiformes’, in Briant (n. 3), 173–99, at 188–90. Canals were used defensively later by Seleucus, *DS* 18.73.3, and Patrocles, whom Seleucus had appointed as general of Babylonia, *DS* 19.100.5–6.

Artaxerxes, why they had taken the field against the king, and counselled them to reply moderately. Clearchus responded for the generals, but his tone was quite different from that recorded earlier (2.1.4, 2.1.22–3). Instead of the bluster that the Greeks would attack Artaxerxes, Clearchus now stated that the Greeks just wanted to go home in peace, but added that if someone harmed them they would try, with the help of the gods, to defend themselves (*ἀμύνασθαι*). The very different tone is a further indication that Clearchus and the generals were extremely worried, and had been intimidated by the obstacles they had encountered on the march to the villages (2.3.14, 17–20, 23).¹⁰

Tissaphernes, according to Xenophon, did not comment on Clearchus' words, which left the Greeks with no idea of the Persian attitude to their response. He did say that the truce would continue until he returned, and added that the Persians would provide a market (2.3.24). This, I think, is a new development. The Persians had led the Greeks to villages from which they took provisions (*λαμβάνειν*) (2.3.14), which suggests that no payment was made. Clearchus' words at 2.3.5 that '... there is no one who would dare to speak to the Greeks concerning a truce without having provided breakfast' (. . . οὐδ' ὁ τολμήσων περὶ σπονδῶν λέγειν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι μὴ πορίσας ἄριστον) support the idea that the Persians fed the Greeks without payment, as does Xenophon's comment at 3.1.28 that Tissaphernes tried all means, including giving the Greeks provisions (*παρέχων*), to obtain a truce.

The Greeks had been taken through country which was clearly hostile to them, with many obstacles and no food. They finally arrived at villages with plenty of good supplies, which they were allowed to sample, and were led to believe that Tissaphernes would like to help them, but needed time to organize that assistance. Tissaphernes appears to have introduced the market at a time when the Greeks were in no position to do anything but agree to it.

The Greeks became anxious when Tissaphernes did not return the next day. He arrived on the third day and told them he had arranged that permission be given by the king for him to save the Greeks, even though very many men opposed the idea (2.3.25). Tissaphernes' language emphasized to the Greeks that he was their only hope. He then dictated the terms of the treaty.

The Ten Thousand were in a unique position. No other Greek force has been recorded as reaching so far into Persian territory. However, the terms laid down by Tissaphernes were not unusual. An army did not plunder friendly territory and, if Tissaphernes was going to help the Greeks, it was reasonable to insist that they regard his country as friendly. In travelling through friendly territory, it was customary for a market to be provided, which Tissaphernes did.¹¹ The problem was money.

¹⁰ C. L. Brownson (trans.), *Xenophon Anabasis* (Suffolk, 1992), 133 translated *ἀμύνασθαι* as 'to retaliate' in the Loeb edition, but there are only two occurrences in the Xenophontic corpus of the verb meaning the assertive and positive 'to retaliate' or 'to seek revenge', and I think the most likely meaning here is the more passive 'to defend'. *ἀμύνασθαι* is usually used in the middle form by Xenophon, as he has done in this passage. There are nineteen occurrences of the word in Xenophon's works, and the meaning is 'to defend' in seventeen instances (e.g. *Xen. Hell.* 3.5.4, 4.5.5, *An.* 3.1.14), fifteen in the middle and two in the active form (*Cyr.* 3.3.67, 5.3.5). Xenophon twice uses *ἀμύνασθαι* with the meaning 'to have revenge' and these occur at *Cyr.* 5.4.21 and 5.4.26. *μέντοι* . . . *μέντοι* in Xenophon is adversative, but I do not think this alters the meaning of *ἀμύνασθαι* here. For other examples of *μέντοι* . . . *μέντοι* in Xenophon, see e.g. *Hell.* 2.4.12, 3.2.18, *An.* 2.3.9.

¹¹ Pritchett (n. 5), 36 (treaty), 45 (market).

IV. ΜΙΣΘΟΣ AND ΣΙΤΗΡΕΣΙΟΝ

Although Xenophon makes no explicit reference to the issuing of provisions,¹² it seems reasonable to assume, with Griffith, that Cyrus supplied rations to the army and that this was separate from the pay he promised.¹³ These rations may have been distributed as food, permission to plunder (1.2.19), or money with which to purchase provisions. Diodorus comments that Cyrus won over the army in part by providing an abundance of provisions (δαφιλείς ἀγορὰς ἐτοιμάζων, 14.19.9, cf. 14.21.6). Xenophon notes that, after the battle of Cunaxa, Artaxerxes and his army plundered four hundred wagons of flour and wine which Cyrus had been holding for emergencies (1.10.18–19). An agora accompanied the army (1.2.18, 3.14, 5.6), and the Greeks also purchased supplies from towns the army passed during the march.¹⁴

At the time the truce was negotiated the Greeks may not have been paid since Cyrus gave the soldiers four months' pay at Caystru-pedion (1.2.11–12).¹⁵ Cheirisophus and the Spartans who joined the army later at Issus (1.4.3) may have received no payment at all. It is possible that the Greeks received wages from the 'much money for the army' (χρήματα πολλά εἰς τὴν στρατιάν) which Syennesis gave Cyrus at their meeting (1.2.27), and the lack of comment about unpaid wages probably indicates that Cyrus was able to pay his mercenaries enough out of this money to keep them marching. There were not many opportunities to spend their pay on the march up country, so it is reasonable to assume that most of the mercenaries had at least some money when the negotiations with Tissaphernes were taking place.¹⁶

¹² The question of whether the pay (μισθός) the Greek mercenaries received included an allowance for provisions (σιτηρέσιον) is complex. There are four references in Xenophon's *Anabasis* which are helpful. Cyrus promised the hoplites one daric a month (1.3.21). Thibron, too, offered to pay the men one daric a month (7.6.1). When the army was in Thrace, Seuthes undertook to give the mercenaries one Cyzicene a month pay (μισθός) (7.3.10). All these figures convert to approximately five Attic obols a day. It suggests that this rate was standard for the time, but does not clarify whether the figure was a composite of pay and provision allowance, or for pay alone. However, Seuthes also said that in addition to their pay the mercenaries were to obtain food and drink by plundering. Finally, Xenophon told the soldiers, when they were encamped near Perinthus, that Aristarchus said that if they went to the Chersonese he would neither sell them into slavery any longer as he had done in Byzantium, nor would they be cheated any longer, but would receive pay, nor would he overlook any longer their being in need of provisions (7.3.3): G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1935), 266. The rate of pay incidentally implies that wages were to be paid monthly although, as Pritchett (n. 5), 24–9 notes, armies were often paid irregularly. A Cyzicene is approximately equal to a daric: J. Roy, 'The mercenaries of Cyrus', *Historia* 16 (1967), 287–323, at 309–10. Timasion at 5.6.23 also offered the mercenaries a Cyzicene per month.

¹³ Griffith (n. 12), 266. See too Pritchett (n. 5), 37. The only specific mention of σιτηρέσιον in the *Anabasis* (or in fact in the Xenophontic corpus) occurs at 6.2.4 when Lycon the Achaean suggests that the generals should obtain ration money instead of accepting the inadequate gifts of food from the Heracleots.

¹⁴ For example, at Charmande (1.5.10) the Greeks purchased wine and bread made from millet. It is notable that these were not luxury items. Xenophon also makes no mention of uniforms, although Cyrus may have issued them to the Greeks: 1.2.16.

¹⁵ This pay covered three months in arrears and one month in advance, but Xenophon reports the army marching more than four months after that (one hundred and twenty-three stages) to reach Cunaxa. It was about a further twenty-five days before they began the march back to Greece, that is, first night after the battle, 1.10.19; second night, 2.2.7; third night, 2.2.16–17; fourth and fifth nights, 2.3.17; the Greeks and Ariaeus wait for Tissaphernes for more than twenty days, 2.4.1. The march back begins at 2.4.9.

¹⁶ Thuc. 6.31.3–5 describes the equipping of the land forces going on the Sicilian expedition. Thucydides mentions that the soldiers received pay, but also took their own money and goods for barter. I assume that the mercenaries kept their money on them when they were fighting. The

The Greeks probably agreed to purchase provisions from Tissaphernes' market, knowing that they had little money, because they felt hopelessly trapped. They knew from experience how difficult it was to obtain supplies, and had been shown how forbidding the territory through which they had to pass was. They had been made to feel increasingly anxious. Then Tissaphernes held out the hand of friendship, at the same time assuring them that he was the *only* one who could or would help them. They were in no position to argue over details, but undoubtedly had sufficient money to feel that they could buy provisions initially, and then renegotiate the issue once they were out of immediate danger. If Xenophon's accusation is correct (3.2.21), the high prices charged in the Persian market would have eroded their resources even more quickly than they expected.¹⁷ The only comment concerning provisions Xenophon records following the truce is Clearchus', that if the Greeks moved away they would lose the market (2.4.5). The primary concern of the soldiers at this time was the extreme danger in which they found themselves.

V. THE BEGINNING OF THE MARCH HOME

After the treaty had been agreed, Artaxerxes went to Babylon with his army. Diodorus writes that Tissaphernes saw that Artaxerxes was angry with the Greeks and promised him that he would destroy them all (DS 14.26.5).¹⁸ Diodorus' version shows that Tissaphernes was doing just what the Greek soldiers feared (2.4.3), organizing their destruction. In 396 (so Xenophon alleges) Tissaphernes employed against Agesilaus this same technique of making a truce and using the time he gained to gather forces with which to attack the Greeks.¹⁹

While waiting for Tissaphernes to return, many of the soldiers urged Clearchus to move the army away from the Persians but he refused, according to Xenophon, on the grounds that it would be interpreted as a hostile act in violation of the truce. Clearchus doubted that the Persian king would break the oaths and pledges he had given (2.4.1–7). However, it is notable that Artaxerxes had not been a party to the treaty agreed between the Greeks, Tissaphernes, and Artaxerxes' brother-in-law (2.3.28). Xenophon adds that Clearchus had many objections of this kind. It seems that Clearchus had been thoroughly intimidated.

Lewis mentions the difficulty of determining the details and significance of oaths made between Greeks and Persians.²⁰ Xenophon's narrative throughout this section of the *Anabasis* in particular places great stress on the perjury of the Persians. The agreement to return with Ariaeus had been ratified by oaths sworn by the Greek leaders, Ariaeus and his highest-ranking officers, and strengthened by the use of ritual (2.2.9).²¹ Xenophon's detailed description was undoubtedly intended to emphasize the treachery of Ariaeus in deserting the Greeks at a time when they really needed friends.

Persian army had plundered the Greeks' personal possessions, food and drink after the battle of Cunaxa: 1.10.18.

¹⁷ Although the 'small measures for much silver' is undoubtedly part of Xenophon's rhetoric, the Persians are unlikely to have felt constrained to sell at bargain prices.

¹⁸ Unfortunately there is a large break in Diodorus' text following this passage. The text resumes with the arrest of the generals.

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.6, *Ages.* 1.10–11. This passage is also discussed by J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (London and New York, 1995), 108–9.

²⁰ Lewis (n. 1), 152, n. 109.

²¹ Cf. 2.5.39, where Cleonor refers to the agreement using the language employed in offensive and defensive alliances, that they had sworn to regard the same people as friends and enemies

The treaty the Greeks negotiated with Tissaphernes for their safe conduct back to Greece had been sealed by the leaders of each side swearing oaths and giving their right hands in pledge (2.3.28). There is no mention of an animal sacrifice. Xenophon consistently portrays Tissaphernes as an oath-breaker, but the evidence from his *Anabasis* suggests that, in these difficult times, few felt constrained by oaths they exchanged.²²

Tissaphernes eventually rejoined the Greeks and the march home began, with Tissaphernes providing a market (2.4.8–12).

An incident at the Tigris River, in which a messenger from Ariaeus and Artaozus warned the Greeks to be on their guard because they might be attacked in the night, exacerbated the Greeks' feelings of anxiety. Xenophon noted that when Clearchus heard the message he became very agitated and fearful, indicating that anxiety levels were high, because up to that point Clearchus had been careful to conceal his feelings.²³ That incident occurred about five days after the march back began, and suggests that Ariaeus was then working in collusion with Tissaphernes to destabilize the Greek army. Xenophon points out that the messenger, although coming from Menon's friend Ariaeus, did not ask for Menon, but for Proxenus or Clearchus, hinting that Menon knew what was going to happen (2.4.12–20).²⁴

As Barnett has noted, the geography of this section of the march is confused, despite the fact that Xenophon is usually reliable when writing about what he has seen in person.²⁵ Xenophon does not refer to the crossing of the Lesser Zab River (Nahr az Zāb aṣ Ṣaḡhir). This river is much smaller than the Greater Zab or Zapatas, and (now

(τοὺς αὐτοὺς φίλους καὶ ἐχθρούς). Further examples of this formula occur at Thuc. 1.44.1, 3.70.6, 3.75.2, 7.33.6, Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20, 5.3.26, and Isoc. *De big.* 41. The ritual was the sacrifice of a bull, a boar, and a ram over a shield. The Greeks dipped a sword into the blood and the Persians dipped a lance. This would seem to be a Greek ritual. Elsewhere, for example at 4.8.7, Xenophon reports that the Greeks went along with the customs of the territory through which they were passing. Demosthenes (23.67–8) records that a man who lays a charge of homicide in the Court of the Areopagus must make an oath calling down the utter destruction of himself, his family, and his household, while standing over the entrails of a boar, a ram, and a bull. He adds that this is not an ordinary oath, but one which no man swears for any other reason. L. Gernet, *The Anthropology of Ancient Greece*, trans. J. Hamilton and B. Nagy (Baltimore and London, 1981), 168 refers to lines 43ff. of Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* for an example of a bull sacrificed over a shield. Isocrates at *Philippus* 91 comments that the Persians gave pledges considered to be the most solemn there, but Xenophon gives no indication of what oaths the Persians swore.

²² On this point, see further p. 456. Persian faithlessness is noted by L. G. Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts* (Cambridge, 1997), 114. The Cyreans later concluded a treaty with Tiribazus, the hyparch of Armenia. Significantly, yet again, some of the Greeks broke the treaty, and a captured prisoner told the Greeks that Tiribazus was planning to ambush them. Xenophon's narrative does not explain whether this was retaliation, or whether Tiribazus had no intention of keeping the treaty, (4.4.4, 6, 14, 16–18). Photius' epitome of Ctesias' *Persica* contains examples which indicate that some Persians did not necessarily feel obliged to honour oaths they exchanged with each other, see for example, *FGrH* 688 F 15, paragraphs 50 and 52 in the text. The trial of Orontas at 1.6.6–8 is an example of Persians making agreements with each other. There Cyrus and Orontas gave each other their right hands, and on another occasion gave and received pledges (πιστά). I. M. Handley-Schachler, 'Achaemenid religion 521–465 B.C.', MS D.Phil. thesis (Oxford, 1992), 114–15 also discusses Persian oaths, but sheds no further light on this subject. Ariaeus' abandonment of the Greeks was a bitter blow at a most vulnerable time. There are a number of references in the *Anabasis* to Ariaeus' treachery (e.g. 2.4.2, 9, 2.5.39, 3.2.2 and 5).

²³ For example, 2.1.21–3, 2.2, 2.16, 3.2–9, 3.21–3, and 4.5–7.

²⁴ Polyæn. *Strateg.* 2.2.4 appears to refer to the incident at the Tigris, but Polyænus writes that the messenger was a pretend deserter sent by Clearchus to prevent the Greeks from encamping on the isthmus, which does not seem to be correct.

²⁵ R. D. Barnett, 'Xenophon and the wall of media', *JHS* 83 (1963), 1–26, at 1, 26.

at least) has sandy stretches which could absorb a good deal of water in the dry season. Barnett notes that the Greeks marched through the area when the rivers were low. Commentators have been surprised by the omission.²⁶ Perhaps the Lesser Zab was rather low at the time Xenophon crossed it, and it simply did not register, but then he mentions the smaller Phycus. I suggest that Xenophon's oversight of the Lesser Zab is a graphic illustration of the enormous tension which all the Greeks felt at this time.

VI. CTESIAS AND XENOPHON COMPARED

What happened next appears confused and difficult to interpret. However, it is possible to reconstruct what seems to have taken place, albeit by using the high-risk method of reconciling sources. Although it is unquestionably true that much of Ctesias' information in this section came from Clearchus, he need not have been Ctesias' only source of information.²⁷ It is important to keep in mind, too, that Xenophon had read Ctesias' version, and that Xenophon's account is a response to it. As so often, Xenophon's omissions are significant.

It is of particular note that Xenophon does not refer to Menon's activities directly from the day following the battle (2.2.1) until he accompanies the other generals to Tissaphernes' tent (2.5.31), but reveals in passing some details that corroborate Ctesias' version.²⁸

Photius' epitome records Ctesias' claim that Tissaphernes plotted to destroy the Greeks. He won Menon over, and used him to overcome Clearchus and the other generals by means of a deception and oaths.²⁹ The issue of defeating the Greeks by oaths is discussed below.

Xenophon comments that Clearchus was aware that Menon had met Tissaphernes in the company of Ariaeus, confirming Ctesias' version, and adds that Menon was in conflict with Clearchus and plotting against him in an attempt to become leader of the Cyreans (2.5.28). It would seem a reasonable guess to suggest that the deception Tissaphernes employed, referred to by Ctesias, was to encourage Menon to believe Tissaphernes would support his leadership aspirations (*FGrH* 688 F 27).

Next Ctesias, in Photius' epitome, commented that Clearchus foresaw the plot and tried to beat it off (*FGrH* 688 F 27). This has been interpreted as apologetic. However, if by 'plot' (ἐπιβουλῇ) Ctesias was referring to Menon's attempt to usurp Clearchus' position, an explanation is possible. It is quite striking that, in his meeting with Tissaphernes, as reported by Xenophon (2.5.3–15), Clearchus puts a great deal of

²⁶ Ibid., 25. O. Lendle, *Kommentar zu Xenophons Anabasis (Bücher 1–7)* (Darmstadt, 1995), 122, 123, attempts to resolve the omission by suggesting, unconvincingly and without any supporting evidence, that Xenophon recorded the crossing of the Greater and Lesser Zab rivers, but then in writing the *Anabasis* mistrusted his notes.

²⁷ Some authors note that Ctesias' information came from Clearchus, without considering that other sources may also have provided comments. See, for example, J. M. Bigwood, 'The ancient accounts of the battle of Cunaxa', *AJP* 104 (1983), 340–57, at 356. Hirsch (n. 1), 160, n. 48.

²⁸ T. S. Brown, 'Menon of Thessaly', *Historia* 35 (1986), 387–404, at 393, mistakenly claims that Xenophon's last reference to Menon before the meeting in Tissaphernes' tent was on the day of the battle of Cunaxa.

²⁹ *FGrH* 688 F 15 contains two examples (paragraphs 50 and 52 in the text) of Darius and Parysatis overcoming enemies by the use of a deception and oaths. Photius' *Bibliotheca* contains only one other instance of a deception and oaths used in combination in this way, 224.230a.40, but see also 80.58b.39 where the deception is the oath. This suggests that the combination is not formulaic in Photius.

emphasis upon his role as leader of the Greeks, and the fact that he can control them.³⁰ He also sets out his reasons for hoping that he and Tissaphernes can be friends. This meeting is discussed in detail below. The whole tone of Clearchus' speech suggests that he was trying both to win Tissaphernes' support, and to impress upon Tissaphernes the advantages of having Clearchus as leader over any other candidate.

As a result of this meeting, Clearchus obviously felt he had Tissaphernes' support, and that Menon had suffered a setback in his plan to gain control of the army. Clearchus reported the arrangement he and Tissaphernes had come to, that all the generals and captains should attend a meeting in Tissaphernes' tent (2.5.27).

Xenophon writes that *some* of the soldiers (τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν . . . τινες) spoke against the proposal, saying that not all the captains and generals should go, and that Tissaphernes should not be trusted (2.5.29). This is clearly connected with Ctesias' comment, epitomized by Photius, that the *majority* (πλήθος) had been deceived by Menon and forced the unwilling Clearchus to go to Tissaphernes (FGrH 688 F 27). The implication of the statement is that Menon had been successful in persuading most of the soldiers that their safety could only be guaranteed with him as their leader. Mercenary soldiers could and did change allegiance when they felt it was in their best interests to serve under another general, as Xenias and Pasion had found on the march up country (1.3.7). Anxiety levels in the army were high, leaving plenty of scope for manipulation of emotions by an ambitious junior officer. The Photius epitome also records that Proxenus had been won over beforehand, and joined in recommending the deception. There is no mention of Proxenus meeting Tissaphernes. It was Menon who persuaded Proxenus that he would be the better leader, and presumably also Proxenus would have been the *de facto* second-in-command, as he may have been to Clearchus.³¹

For Clearchus to have been forced to go to Tissaphernes and to have been unwilling, as Ctesias' version suggests, the majority must have made it clear that they believed Menon's presumed position, that is, that Clearchus was largely responsible for the tensions which existed between the Greeks and Persians, and that a more Persian-friendly leader would improve their conditions immeasurably. Clearchus would certainly have been unwilling to accept the role of scapegoat and to go to Tissaphernes on that basis.

According to Xenophon, Clearchus was vehemently insistent, until he brought about agreement that five generals and twenty captains should go (2.5.29–30). From Clearchus' point of view, failure to arrive with all (or most) of the generals and captains, as he had undertaken to do, would suggest that his control of the army was not as complete as he had led Tissaphernes to believe, and would harm his position with the Persian satrap. This presumes that Clearchus still believed that Tissaphernes would support him in a leadership contest.

Clearchus' unwillingness to go to Tissaphernes, as Ctesias records it, and his vehement insistence that all the generals and captains should attend, referred to by Xenophon, actually reflect different stages of the argument during the meeting of the army. The final decision, that Clearchus would go, along with five generals and twenty captains, is the negotiated compromise, as Xenophon's version demonstrates.

³⁰ See e.g. . . . νομίζω ἂν σὺν τῇ παρούσῃ δυνάμει ταπεινοὺς ὑμῖν παρασχεῖν, . . . ἃ (these troublesome tribes) οἴμαι ἂν παῦσαι ἐνοχλοῦντα ἀεὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, as for the Egyptians . . . οὐχ ὥρῳ ποῖα δυνάμει συμμαχῶ χρησάμεοι μᾶλλον ἂν κολάσαισθε τῆς νῦν σὺν ἐμοὶ οὐσης.

³¹ At the time of the battle of Cunaxa, Proxenus certainly had the second largest number of troops. See, for example, 1.10.5, although Xenophon adds the comment here that Clearchus consulted Proxenus because he was nearest in the line: 1.5.16 and 2.4.15.

When the generals met Tissaphernes, the proposal to replace Clearchus as leader and install Menon was revealed as the clever deception it was. Tissaphernes was able to arrest the generals on a technicality, discussed below.

Following is a more detailed discussion of the events preceding the arrest of the generals, based upon Xenophon's account in the *Anabasis*.

VII. CLEARCHUS' MEETING WITH TISSAPHERNES

Xenophon notes that the armies halted for three days at the Zapatas River, during which period, although no plot was evident, suspicions were high among the Greeks. In an attempt to defuse the situation, Clearchus took the initiative, an unusual step for him, and decided to meet Tissaphernes (2.5.1–2). The interview took place about three weeks after the beginning of the march. The tone of the conversation, if it reflects what actually took place, suggests that no interpreter was present.³²

Xenophon writes that Clearchus reported to the Greeks what Tissaphernes had said (2.5.27), so it is reasonable to assume that what is recorded here is close to Clearchus' version of events. Clearchus was apparently aiming in this meeting to clear up the mistrust existing between the Greeks and Persians, to emphasize the usefulness of the Greek army, and to assert his own position as its leader. According to Xenophon, Clearchus pointed out that Tissaphernes had no grounds for mistrusting the Greeks. The oaths they had sworn by the gods prevented them from being enemies to one another. Clearchus emphatically followed up this point by commenting that anyone who broke these oaths would become an enemy of the gods, who would punish the offender (2.5.3–8). Clearchus' focus is solely on oaths of friendship. His words sound as though he believed that the Greeks and Tissaphernes had exchanged oaths of alliance, similar to the one the Greeks had contracted with Ariaeus (2.2.8–9). Xenophon's description of the treaty between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, however, indicates that all that the Persians had agreed was that they would make the *territory* the Cyreans passed through friendly (2.3.25–8). Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes' brother-in-law swore that the Persians would lead the way without treachery, but there was no oath of friendship or alliance. Clearchus either misunderstood the oaths they had exchanged or, more likely, was trying to convince Tissaphernes that the Greeks were taking this oath more seriously than was strictly necessary, perhaps in the hope that Tissaphernes would reciprocate.

Clearchus mentioned to Tissaphernes that the Greek army he led could be useful to the Persians (*ὕμιν*) with some of the rebellious tribes, that is the ones Cyrus had been campaigning against (1.9.14), and also with Egypt (2.5.9–13).³³

³² It is most likely that Tissaphernes and other Persians used interpreters on public occasions, e.g. 2.3.17, and dispensed with them for private discussions. P. Georges, *Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience* (Baltimore, 1994), 227, suggests that if interpreters were present Xenophon mentions them, but this does not always happen. See, for example, the trial of Orontas in which Clearchus took part (1.6.5ff.). No interpreter is mentioned, but it is surely highly unlikely that the proceedings were conducted in Greek. The Greeks had their own interpreter (2.5.35). Pigres is referred to as Cyrus' interpreter (1.2.17 and 1.8.12), but Xenophon does not refer to Cyrus using him during discussions with the generals. M. Miller, *Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century B.C.—A Study in Cultural Receptivity* (Cambridge, 1997), 132, comments that Persian satraps apparently spoke Greek, but provides no supporting evidence. They *may* have done, but the evidence mentioned above tends to suggest that, even if they did, they did not feel confident that their Greek was fluent enough to cope with every conversation in which it was required.

³³ In describing the meeting with Phalinus, Xenophon comments that some of the generals grew more cowardly and suggested that the Greeks could be useful to the king in a campaign

As leader of the Greek mercenaries it was Clearchus' responsibility to find a new employer. The men were short of money, and there were no current prospects of obtaining wages and provisions except by persuading the Persians, or a Persian, to employ them. He had proposed the idea that the Persians might use the Cyreans, and presumably Tissaphernes indicated in some way that this was unlikely. Clearchus moved on to his next point, indicated by the use of ἀλλὰ μὲν . . . γε.³⁴ He suggested that the army could be useful to Tissaphernes personally and indicated that, with the Greeks in his service, Tissaphernes could be the greatest possible friend to those who lived around him, and could behave as a master (δεσπότης) to anyone who vexed him (2.5.14). Clearchus' language, as Xenophon reports it, was carefully chosen. His words imply that he limited his suggestion by stating that the Cyreans could be useful in Tissaphernes' satrapy (ἀλλὰ μὲν ἔν γε τοῖς περίξ οἰκοῦσι). The Greeks could help Tissaphernes become the most powerful satrap in Asia Minor. However, the use of δεσπότης here is significant, because it was well known that Persians, even the most high-ranking, were considered to be the slaves of their master, the Great King of Persia.³⁵ Clearchus was suggesting to yet another Persian that the Ten Thousand, despite their denials at 2.3.23, were available for hire.³⁶ It is possible that he even hinted, in the light of his use of δεσπότης and Tissaphernes' comments (discussed below), that the Greeks would be willing to follow their employer beyond the borders of his satrapy. This proposal was not, as Descat suggested, the wish of the Greek army, but Clearchus' own attempt to find a solution to their dilemma.³⁷

Tissaphernes smoothly acknowledged the suggestion, when he said that the Great King alone was permitted to wear the tiara upright upon the head, but that another, with the help of the Greeks, could easily wear the one upon the heart (2.5.23). Roisman suggests that this comment, which Tissaphernes claimed as the greatest way in which the Greeks could be useful to him, implies not that he had designs upon the Persian throne, but upon usurping the King's power base, leaving Artaxerxes as a figure-head, just as Cyrus had attempted to do in Sardis. However, what Tissaphernes was actually doing was attempting to lure Clearchus on to further indiscretions, and Clearchus' belief that he and Tissaphernes were on extremely friendly terms (2.5.27) supports this idea.³⁸ If Tissaphernes actually spoke these words, it is unlikely that an interpreter was present at the time.

against Egypt, among other things (2.1.14). In Egypt, Amyrtaeus II was leading a revolt from Persian rule. The dating of this revolt is not yet established, but began roughly in 405, and by 400 Amyrtaeus and his supporters appear to have gained control of the whole of upper Egypt, including Elephantine. A number of senior satraps, one of them Pharnabazus (DS 15.29.3–4, 15.41.1), were sent to Egypt over the next sixty years to try to quell the uprising, but Egypt was not brought under Persian control again until 342. M. A. Dandamaev, *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire*, trans. W. J. Vogelsang (Leiden, 1989), 270–3.

³⁴ Clearchus emphasized throughout this speech the fact that he was the leader of the Greeks. See above for details. The use of ἀλλὰ μὲν is progressive here: J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1981²), 119, 344, 345.

³⁵ Hdt. 8.102.9; Thuc. 6.77; Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.35–6, *An.* 1.9.29, 2.5.38, 3.2.13; Dem. *Phil.* 3.43.4. Roisman (n. 1), 43.

³⁶ Clearchus had suggested to Ariaeus that the Greeks would put him on the throne: 2.1.4.

³⁷ Descat (n. 3), 105.

³⁸ For Cyrus' attempts to win over members of Artaxerxes' court, see 1.1.5. Roisman (n. 1), 46, n. 40. *FGrH* 688 F 26 = Plu. *Art.* 15.2–7 records a conversation said to have taken place between Parysatis' chief eunuch and Mithridates, the Persian who killed Cyrus. In that the eunuch encouraged Mithridates to speak indiscreetly, using the same technique Tissaphernes employed on Clearchus. The eunuch then reported Mithridates' words, and Mithridates was tortured to death.

Xenophon reports that Clearchus then asked for the name of the man (in the singular) who had persuaded Tissaphernes that the Greeks were plotting against him (2.5.15). It is significant that Clearchus referred to Tissaphernes alone being suspicious, and that he thought Tissaphernes was suspicious of 'us', that is, all the Greeks.

Tissaphernes' reply, as written by Xenophon, is carefully crafted to display his duplicity. He quickly linked himself with Artaxerxes, and gave reasons why the Greeks (*ύμεις*) were wrong to distrust them both, although Clearchus' comments had been directed solely at Tissaphernes' suspicions. He implied that he wanted to become more powerful by using the Greeks. He reinforced the idea that the Persians could annihilate the Greeks if they so desired. As part of this, Tissaphernes queried why the Persians would choose, out of all the options open to them, the way which was impious in the sight of the gods and base in the sight of men. This indirect reference is the only comment Xenophon records Tissaphernes making about the oaths that had been exchanged. Tissaphernes asserted firmly to Clearchus that the Greeks had been spared because of his, Tissaphernes', desire to help them (2.5.16–23).

It is easy to forget that Tissaphernes did not know at this point that Clearchus would play into his hands. Much of his speech is taken up with warning Clearchus how easily the Persians could destroy the Greeks. The very vehemence of Tissaphernes' reply suggests that Tissaphernes himself was afraid of the Greek army and its potential. He even acknowledges the inconsistency of the apparently overwhelming advantages of the Persians and their hesitation to annihilate the Greeks. He rhetorically asks why the Persians had not destroyed them, and answers that the reason was his passion to prove himself trustworthy to the Greeks, again stressing to Clearchus that Tissaphernes was the only one who could or would save the Cyreans (2.5.22).

According to Xenophon, Clearchus believed that Tissaphernes was telling the truth, and suggested that those who were putting forth false accusations should suffer the highest penalty. Tissaphernes said that if the generals and captains were willing to come to him, he would publicly name the men who said that 'you are plotting against me . . .' (*σὺ ἐμοὶ ἐπιβουλεύεις*). That is, according to Xenophon, Tissaphernes used the second-person singular, making it clear that only Clearchus was implicated. It is also significant that Tissaphernes used the plural 'men', whereas Clearchus had assumed there was only one man, Menon, giving information to Tissaphernes. This was guaranteed to cause trouble in the Greek camp. Clearchus said that he would, in turn, disclose those from whom he had heard accusations concerning Tissaphernes. Perhaps this was a ploy on Clearchus' part, but if not it suggests that Clearchus was totally convinced of Tissaphernes' friendship and support, and potentially willing to allow a Persian to mete out justice to Greeks (2.5.24–6).³⁹

VIII. THE ARREST OF THE GENERALS

Following this conversation, Tissaphernes, as Xenophon describes events, treated Clearchus with courtesy and urged him to stay overnight, and Clearchus was a guest at dinner. The next day, Clearchus returned to the Greek camp. He believed that he was on very friendly terms with Tissaphernes, and was undoubtedly lulled into a false sense of security by the Greek laws of hospitality and the protection of Zeus Xenios, to which Cleanor later refers (3.2.4). Clearchus insisted that those Tissaphernes had invited must go to him. He went on, according to Xenophon, to insist that if any

³⁹ Polyaeus (*Strateg.* 7.18.1) says that Tissaphernes made a treaty with Clearchus, and told him that he would make the same treaty with the other leaders of the Greeks if they came to him.

Greeks were convicted of slander they should be punished as traitors and as men ill-disposed towards the Greeks. Clearchus here used the plural, presumably a result of his conversation with Tissaphernes. Xenophon adds the editorial comment that Clearchus suspected that Menon was behind the slander (2.5.28). He writes that Clearchus knew that Menon had met Tissaphernes in the company of Ariaeus and was at variance with Clearchus and plotting to win the whole army over to himself, so that he might become a friend to Tissaphernes. But Clearchus wanted the whole army to be devoted to him and 'those who caused trouble' (τοὺς παραλυποῦντας) to be removed. The use of the plural suggests that Menon was no longer Clearchus' only target. The rivalry between Clearchus and Menon appears to have been common knowledge, but Xenophon does not say how he knew what Clearchus was thinking. Perhaps, as Brown suggests, this information came from Ctesias (2.5.27–9).⁴⁰

The generals Proxenus, Menon, Agias, Clearchus, and Socrates went through Tissaphernes' doors and the captains waited outside. Both Xenophon (2.5.32) and Diodorus (14.26.7) agree that not much later a signal was given and those inside were arrested and those outside were killed. Cawkwell proposes that the flag which Diodorus mentions as the 'signal' may not have been a pre-arranged signal, but a general alarm.⁴¹ However, the only other examples I could find of Diodorus' word *φαινικίς* used in the sense of 'a red flag hung out as the signal for action' suggest that this was indeed a pre-arranged signal.⁴² Diodorus says, too, that Persian troops had been appointed to kill the captains. The Greeks left behind were bewildered at first, but then panicked and ran for their weapons, fearing that the Persians would attack immediately (2.5.31–2, 34; DS 14.26.6–27.1).⁴³ The reaction in the camp, and the fact that the soldiers who accompanied the generals and captains were caught unawares and apparently unarmed, suggests that Tissaphernes had indeed been skilful in his manipulation of the Greeks and that, although they were suspicious of him, they had not anticipated the outcome of the meeting. In fact, the surprisingly relaxed attitude of the soldiers (given that most of their leaders were in enemy hands) indicates that they had expected an altogether different result, that is, a resolution of the hostility between Persians and Greeks, which 'the majority' seem to have been convinced could be effected by a change in the Greek leadership.

Of particular significance, too, was the fact that a senior general like Cheirisophus was in another village obtaining provisions at such a vital time (2.5.37).

IX. CONQUERED BY OATHS

The statement in Photius' epitome that Ctesias claimed that Tissaphernes conquered the Greeks by oaths (*FGrH* 688 F 27) is, I think, the key to the fate of the generals.

⁴⁰ Brown (n. 28), 394. Xenophon undoubtedly intended his comment at 6.1.29 to be a pointed reference to Menon and his conflict with Clearchus, νομίζω γὰρ ὅστις ἐν πολέμῳ ὃν στασιάζει πρὸς ἄρχοντα, τοῦτον πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίαν στασιάζειν. Xenophon has Tissaphernes make a similar comment with regard to Clearchus' relationship to him (2.5.16) ταῦτα γὰρ γιγνώσκων εἴ τι ἐμοὶ κακὸν βουλευοίς, ἅμα ἂν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ σαυτῷ κακόνους εἶναι.

⁴¹ Cawkwell (n. 1), 25.

⁴² *φαινικίς* also occurs at DS 13.77.4 and Plb. 2.66.11. The definition is from *LSJ*⁹, 1948.

⁴³ Nicarchus, an Arcadian captain, managed to reach the camp and tell the Greeks what had happened. He had a stomach wound (2.5.33) but, as Lendle (n. 26), 164 has noted, Xenophon refers to Nicarchus again at 3.3.5. There he stated that the Arcadian captain defected to the Persians with about twenty men that same night. It is possible that these two references are to the same man. His stomach wound could have been sewn up, and he may well have recovered from the injury.

They had sworn oaths to buy provisions only from Tissaphernes' market, if that was provided. However, as Xenophon said in one of his addresses to the soldiers following the arrest of the generals, there were only a few men who still had money to buy provisions at that time (3.1.20). He added that their oaths restrained them from obtaining provisions in any other way, but this is hyperbole. Bearing in mind that the Spartan contingent may have received no pay, it is surely significant that Cheirisophus did not go to the market Tissaphernes provided (as two hundred Greek soldiers did), but was foraging in a village when the other generals were arrested (2.5.37), contrary to the terms of the treaty. Xenophon lets slip this vital piece of information in his efforts to explain why Cheirisophus was not with the generals or in the camp at the time of the crisis. Cheirisophus is unlikely to have been the only Greek engaged in foraging, and this is unlikely to have been the only occasion on which it occurred.

Cheirisophus would not have had Persian approval to forage in the village. The terms of the treaty were quite specific. If there was a market, the Greeks were to purchase provisions there (2.3.27). It was only if no market was available that they could forage. Xenophon's narrative mentions quite explicitly that there was a market on the day of the arrest (2.5.30). Another possibility is that Cheirisophus was obtaining supplementary supplies, but again the terms of the treaty prohibited this.⁴⁴

Xenophon reports Ariaeus' claims (2.5.38) that Clearchus had been shown to be swearing falsely and breaking the truce, and on those grounds had been killed. It is of note that Xenophon chooses not to report in what way the truce had been broken. He writes that Ariaeus later added that Clearchus had been shown to be plotting against Tissaphernes, Orontas and all who were with 'us'.⁴⁵

I do not suggest that Tissaphernes relied on this technical infringement of the treaty in any 'legal' or serious way. Tissaphernes, I believe, *always* intended to destroy the Greeks, or as many of them as he could get his hands on. But being able to take the moral high ground was and remains a psychologically powerful technique for cutting the ground from under one's enemies, and leaves them at a decided disadvantage. Tissaphernes was a wily negotiator, who did whatever was necessary to achieve his ends and to catch his opponents off-guard (for example, Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.6). Here, I suggest, is a further example. Cleanor could only make a blustering reply to news of the arrests (2.5.39) because the Greeks knew that they *had* broken the terms of the treaty and technically *were* in the wrong. The clever use of the charge of oath-breaking was guaranteed to worry the superstitious Greeks, who had probably chosen not to examine the implications of their enforced foraging activities too closely. But to have this held up against them in a way they could not avoid would have troubled them greatly because the Greeks believed, as Clearchus states (2.5.7), that those who break their oaths make the gods their enemies. The Greeks were thus left feeling guilty, awkward, and uncertain. In such a state they were most unlikely to go on the defensive

⁴⁴ Cawkwell (n. 1), 25 suggests that Clearchus took the two hundred men along as a kind of bodyguard and that, rather than going to market, they went 'as though to buy provisions'. *ὡς εἰς* occurs in combination twenty-eight times in the Xenophontic corpus. On only one occasion is it clear that a ruse is intended (*Cyr.* 2.4.19). At *Hell.* 2.1.22 the combination is used as part of Lysander's plan to trick the Athenians, but the meaning is still 'with the intention of'. For other references see, e.g., *Hell.* 1.2.6, 2.1.23, *An.* 1.8.1, 24, 1.9.23.1. A further point against Cawkwell's suggestion is that the two hundred men do not appear to have been armed: 2.5.32. On the other hand, even if Cawkwell's translation was accepted, the point remains the same. There was a market.

⁴⁵ Ariaeus' claim (2.5.38) that Clearchus was already dead was false, but perhaps intended to dissuade the Greeks from mounting a rescue operation.

and attack the Persians. Tissaphernes had them right where he wanted them. He was a very clever man.

With most of their leaders arrested, Tissaphernes presumably hoped to pick the rest of the army off and eventually destroy it completely, as he had promised Artaxerxes he would do.

X. SUMMARY

Tissaphernes set out to destroy the Greeks, and laid his plans coldly and calculatedly. He manoeuvred them into a position where they had no option but to swear to a treaty, the terms of which they could not keep. He played the leaders off against each other, and generally did everything he could to increase the fear and anxiety the Greeks were experiencing.

Finally, Tissaphernes managed to separate a large number of leaders from the main body of the army. He then arrested the leaders, as part one of his plan to destroy the Greek army. The pretext given for the seizure of the generals was that they had broken the terms of the treaty by foraging, as they were forced to do. Clearchus, it was alleged, had (i) perjured himself (by breaking his oath not to forage), (ii) broken the terms of the treaty (by foraging), and (iii) was plotting against the Persians (as his attempts to find employment for the Cyreans could be construed).

Tissaphernes sent the generals to Artaxerxes in Babylon, and killed the captains, hoping that the rest of the army would then be easy to pick off. In this, at least, he had miscalculated.⁴⁶

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